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Conspiracy, Class, and Culture in Oceania: 
A View from the Cook Islands
Jeffrey Sissons
Oceanicism, the South Pacific version of orientalism, has been, like its
Northern Hemisphere equivalent, a homogenizing project of power and
discourse that has created racialized identities, essentialized mentalities,
and cultural typologies. While popular publications such as Pacific Islands
Monthly and Islands Business perpetuate and naturalize a colonially ob-
served and structured territory, academic journals—The Contemporary
Pacific, The Journal of Pacific History, and Pacific Studies—confer on it
scholarly legitimacy. This is not to suggest that Oceania is, in truth, an
unnatural or academically illegitimate creation; rather, it is to emphasize
that differences between Oceanic societies may be as profound as those be-
tween Oceania and other imagined regional communities. In recent aca-
demic writing, two of the most powerful homogenizing visions of Oceania
have been those of an insider, Epeli Hau‘ofa. In 1987, Hau‘ofa imagined
his region as culturally integrated at the elite level and divided into tradi-
tional “subcultures” further down. In 1994, he saw Oceania as integrated
lower down, at the proletarian and peasant level, while elites continue to
think small and perpetuate colonial and neocolonial divisions. In this invi-
tation to dialogue I offer a critique of Hau‘ofa’s two visions in order to
develop an argument about class and culture in the Cook Islands and, by
extension, the wider South Pacific. In particular, I question the theoretical
and political value of Hau‘ofa’s elite analysis and argue that it misrepre-
sents the agency, cultural distinctiveness, and cultural nationalism of a
Cook Islands middle class. While I do not extend my argument to French
Polynesia, Hawai‘i, or New Caledonia, the inappropriateness of Hau‘ofa’s
perspective for an understanding of the Cook Islands suggests that it may
also be of limited value in interpreting the role of elites in these and other
decolonizing societies in the region.164
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The central argument advanced in Hau‘ofa’s 1987 article, “The New
South Pacific Society: Integration and Independence” is well known. It is
that government officials, businesspeople, professionals, and intellectuals
are the main beneficiaries of the economic flows that they directly and in-
directly manage, and although they differ in terms of strict occupational
criteria, these groups are closely integrated into a single, privileged stra-
tum to the extent that they “have a great deal more in common with each
other than with members of the other classes in their own communities.”
Among this elite “there is homogeneity throughout the region through the
sharing of a dominant culture”—cultural differences are said to be analo-
gous to variations among exotic dishes at a bourgeois dinner party (1987,
3). Cultural diversity is more common among the underprivileged, espe-
cially those remaining in rural areas where the poor adhere to their tradi-
tions out of necessity. While doing so, they must endure the added indig-
nity of having other traditions thrust on them as part of a determined effort
by elites to maintain social stability and, “secure the privileges that they
have gained, not so much from their involvement in traditional activities,
as from their privileged access to resources in the regional economy. In
such a situation, traditions are used by the ruling classes to enforce the
new order” (1987, 12).
A parallel binarism is at work in Hau‘ofa’s writings almost ten years
later. However, by this time it appears that the poor have assumed greater
control over their vast world, now imagined as Oceania. While the privi-
leged, particularly those involved “directly or indirectly in the fields of
aided development and Pacific rim geopolitics,” continue to perpetuate
the view that Oceania comprises “tiny needy bits.” “Far beneath them
exists that other order, of ordinary people, who are busily and inde-
pendently redefining their world in accordance with their perceptions of
their own interests and of where the future lies for their children and their
children’s children” (Hau‘ofa 1994a, 159; also in Waddell, Naidu, and
Hau‘ofa 1993).
There are, as before, “two levels of operation” (Hau‘ofa 1994a, 148);
on the one hand are politicians, bureaucrats, statutory body officials,
diplomats, military personnel, representatives of financial and business
communities working in conjunction with donor and international lend-
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the other are the “ordinary” “grassroots” people, like Hau‘ofa’s Tongan
friend, an entrepreneur who buys and sells kava, T-shirts, and seafood for
friends and relatives in Fiji, Tonga, and California.
The rhetorical force of Hau‘ofa’s visions owes a great deal to a seduc-
tive binarism and the identification of a homogenized common “oppres-
sor,” and he relies heavily on a conception of power as something
exercised by elites rather than a property inherent in the practices and
structure of the capitalist state and global economy. In an insightful review
of the way “elite” as a concept has been used in social science, George
Marcus pointed out that the term is surrounded by considerable ambigu-
ity: “Clear in what it signifies but ambiguous as to its precise referents,
the concept of elite in general usage has a certain force; it locates agency
in social events by evoking the image of a ruling, controlling few, while
being intractably vague” (1983, 7).
Marcus suggested that the resonant images evoked by talk of elites are
shaped by three broad qualities: agency, exclusivity, and a dichotomous
relationship to nonelites (1983, 10–12). In what follows I consider each
of these qualities in turn and draw on my understanding of the Cook
Islands to highlight the limitations of Hau‘ofa’s apparently more Tonga-
centered views.
Agency
In Hau‘ofa’s discussion of the manipulation of tradition by elites for their
own ends, there is a strong sense that elites have set out to deceive the
poor by encouraging them to adopt inauthentic traditions for dubious
ends. While this may have been true for the Tupou dynasty in Tonga, as a
general argument it ignores the many nonelites throughout the region,
who are intent on preserving or reviving traditions for their own well-
thought-out reasons, and reduces the entire complex process of tradition-
alization to a single unsavory motive—domination. In the Cook Islands
the better educated and relatively privileged have indeed recently assumed
leading roles in revivals of tradition. However, they have not been the only
people engaged in this process, and their motivations have been varied
and complex—certainly not reducible to the maintenance of elite privilege
and social order.
The Cook Islands has, since self-government in 1965, been through two
periods of politically initiated cultural revival, the first between 1974 and
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period, Albert Henry and political leaders belonging to the ruling Cook
Islands Party undoubtedly encouraged traditionalization with a view
toward retaining power. I have discussed elsewhere Albert Henry’s bid to
increase support for the party by forming a new advisory council of local-
level traditional leaders that would complement (if not substitute for) the
existing House of Ariki (Sissons 1994). The thirteen holders of ariki titles,
representing islands or districts of Rarotonga, tended to support the oppo-
sition Democratic Party, whereas the more numerous holders of mata‘iapo
and rangatira titles, representing subdistricts, were, in general, more sup-
portive of the government. By establishing a council of mata‘iapo and
rangatira (termed koutu nui or great council) Henry was elevating these
local-level Cook Islands Party supporters to the status of guardians of the
nation’s cultural heritage.
All this seems to accord well with Hau‘ofa’s argument that tradition
becomes, in the hands of elites, an instrument to enforce a new order.
That is, until it is recognized that mata‘iapo and rangatira were by no
means elites, if by this is meant members of an exclusive, culturally dis-
tinct group who were the main beneficiaries of regional economic flows.
A significant motivation of mata‘iapo and rangatira—many of whom were
“grassroots” people who spoke Mâori, worked in manual occupations or
for the government, and had never attended a bourgeois dinner party in
their lives—was the restoration of their local authority and control. In
other words, for many, a greater recognition of traditional status was
directed, not toward enforcing the new order, but toward changing it.
Further evidence that their agency was distinct from that of the govern-
ment is apparent in the spectacular increase in the frequency and elabo-
rateness of akamarokura (title-investiture ceremonies) following Henry’s
defeat in 1978 by Tom Davis’s Democratic Party. Despite the new govern-
ment’s open antipathy toward the koutu nui, there was a fourfold in-
crease in the number of akamarokura in the period 1978–1982 compared
to the previous five years (Sissons 1994, 387).
In 1975, with an eye to future tourist development, the Cook Islands
Party introduced a new secondary-school curriculum that accorded greater
weight to Cook Islands “culture.” Traditions such as dancing, carving,
weaving, storytelling, and umu-making were promoted in the national
interest and, ultimately, in the interest of “elites” in the tourist industry.
However, the teaching of Cook Islands culture was also passionately
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saw in the new “decolonized” curriculum an opportunity to inculcate in
pupils a greater pride in being Mâori. One teacher described this period
to me as one of great excitement during which he encouraged his pupils
to seek out traditional knowledge from their elders in the hope that the
school would begin to strengthen rather than weaken links between gen-
erations.
To reduce the process of traditionalization in the Cook Islands to the
agency of elites would be to fail to address or even raise the question of
why so many others participated in this project. It would be to assume
that traditional leaders and local teachers were working against what they
believed to be their own interests because they had been deceived or were
being compelled to do so. Neither was the case. Traditionalization was a
contradictory project that brought together and focused a diverse range
of interests, some of which would ultimately come into conflict. This was
also true during the second period of cultural revival that began in 1989.
During the preparations to host the Sixth Festival of Pacific Arts in
1992, the projects of traditional leaders, individual artists, government
employees, tourist operators, teachers, and the media converged, yet re-
tained their distinctiveness. While outer-island villages cooperated under
the direction of traditional leaders in the construction of oceangoing
canoes, they also unwittingly participated, as visual images, in the mar-
keting project of the Tourist Authority. When employees of the Ministry
of Cultural Development encouraged outer-island people to build canoes
and local artists to compose music and design posters in the national
interest, they were also serving the individual interests of members of the
artistic community. Yet tensions were also evident between the ministry,
traditional leaders, and individual artists. Artists complained of too much
administrative interference, and traditional leaders were wary of the hege-
monic designs of the central government. Traditionalization was also pur-
sued quite independently of the festival and tourist marketing: marae were
reconstructed for strictly local, “private” title-investiture ceremonies, and
new marae were established reflecting local political factions.
To argue that traditionalization in the Cook Islands constituted an inte-
grated elite project would be, therefore, to grossly misrepresent a complex
and constantly changing set of alliances and conflicts between different
agents engaged in the traditionalization process. Certainly, for some Cook
Islands Party politicians, the retention of power was always a significant
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process. Sadly, subsequent economic developments suggest that, rather
than deceiving the poor, many may have been deceiving themselves in
relation to future benefits.
Elites are widely credited with what Marcus termed a “phantom-like”
agency, especially in situations of systemic crisis. It is assumed that a quiet
domination of the many by the few, through manipulation and deception,
is at the root of major system breakdowns, especially those of an eco-
nomic nature. The counterargument, familiar to anyone who followed
the Miliband-Poulantzas debate on the nature of state power in the 1970s,
is not that elite agency is ever absent or unimportant but that its presence
is always strongly constrained and enabled by convention (Giddens 1986,
73–75). Elites in the Pacific Islands and elsewhere “act” through the con-
ventions of trade, lending practices, aid diplomacy, bureaucratic proce-
dure, and party politics, as well as through local “tradition.” Thus, when
these elites were described by Hau‘ofa as “locked to each other through
their privileged access to and control of resources moving in the region
and between the South Pacific and other regions of the world” (1987, 3),
he credited them with too much independence from the structures that
unite and divide them. How much control over resources do senior public
servants have in the present economic crisis in the Cook Islands, for
example? Is it not their lack of control over falling tourist numbers, capi-
tal flight, interest rates, lending criteria, airline routes, French nuclear
testing, and the “wine-box” inquiry in New Zealand that characterizes
their position in the region in relation to others with greater control in
New Zealand and elsewhere? Elites in Oceania are as much locked into
each other through lack of effective agency as the reverse.
Exclusivity
Elites are, as Marcus noted, commonly viewed as an exclusive group,
largely invisible to the wider population whom they manipulate. Hau‘ofa
reproduced this common understanding, proposing that the Pacific Island
elite stratum maintains its exclusivity and solidarity through an extraordi-
narily high level of cultural sharing. I suggest that, in general, this view
both understates the high level of cultural sharing between those in posi-
tions of power and others of the wider middle class and overstates the
level of cultural sharing between the middle classes of different Oceanic
nations.
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holders and that this practice facilitates regional cooperation if not inte-
gration. However, it is obvious that English is also widely spoken by
millions of lesser mortals within and beyond the region. In other words,
English speaking is not a cultural practice peculiar to Oceanic elites alone
and cannot reasonably be considered a distinctive component of an elite
culture. In the Cook Islands, English and Mâori are official languages,
and both are spoken in the public service at all levels. English is the main
language used in official reports, and despite efforts to promote greater
use of Mâori in the public service, the informal day-to-day use of English
continues alongside it. English is also increasingly the first language of
young Cook Islanders living in New Zealand and Australia and thus
serves as a medium of regional integration in a much more generalized
sense than Hau‘ofa assumed. Indeed, English speaking has probably had
as significant a role in the development and integration of proletarian cul-
tures throughout the region as it has had in perpetuating elite exclusivity.
If Pacific elites are not culturally distinct in terms of a shared language,
are they perhaps more so in terms of ideology and material lifestyle?
Again, to argue that this is the case is to presume too limited a degree of
cultural sharing within many Pacific Island nations. Certainly in the Cook
Islands beliefs in the value of representative democracy underpinned by
nationalism and individualism are by no means confined to those in posi-
tions of power. Nor do contradictions between these and aspirations to
greater participatory democracy, localism, and tradition-based collectiv-
ism correspond in any simple way to class divisions or an opposition be-
tween elites and nonelites. As I have noted elsewhere, party politics has so
deeply penetrated Cook Islands social life that the discourses of democ-
racy and tradition are of intense and immediate interest to powerful and
powerless alike (Sissons 1994). Ideologies that underpin labor and anti-
colonial movements (if not New Right economics) have held sway among
both leaders and supporters at different periods over the past half century.
The possessive individualism characteristic of bourgeois lifestyles has
been generalized to much of the western world. While downtown Raro-
tonga is clearly not downtown Auckland or Sydney, newish cars, smart
clothes, and videocassette recorders abound there too. Rather than signal-
ing participation in a regional elite network, possession of such material
items and participation in the associated lifestyle simply means that their
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world of movement and mixture, of globalizing flows of people, money,
and commodities.
Paradoxically, globalization incites and reinforces localism. Not only
do arguments about elite exclusivity in Oceania underestimate globaliza-
tion and cultural sharing within nations, they also overstate the level of
cultural sharing between them. While it is true that the speaking of
English is common to public servants and businesspeople throughout the
Pacific Islands, it is obviously not the case that they speak only English
and thus belong to only one language community. English speakers also
speak Bislama, Tongan, Samoan, Fijian, Mâori, and many other languages.
These languages are part of cultural heritages that separate as much as
unite English speakers. True, Hau‘ofa did concede that there were local
variations throughout the region “due to physical environment and origi-
nal cultural factors” (1987, 3), but he dismissed these as minor. I suggest
that they remain significant, and that those in positions of power have
usually had more in common with members of their own national middle
class than with each other.
Dichotomous Relations
While binary distinctions between privileged and underprivileged, rich
and poor, exploiters and exploited, powerful and powerless possess a cer-
tain rhetorical force, they gain it at the expense of analytical power. Thus,
when urban proletarians and rural peasants are put into a single container
labeled “the poor,” on whom the dead weight of tradition is pressed, not
only are historical and cultural differences between the two groups erased,
but different forms of rural and urban participation in the regional econ-
omy are also obscured. Similarly, when administrators and teachers join
bankers and businesspeople as members of the privileged club, antitheti-
cal interests and distinctive relations with urban proletarians and metro-
politan bourgeoisie are glossed over.
Ironically, one of the concerns expressed by Hau‘ofa in his 1987 article
was the strong reluctance on the part of the regional privileged “to recog-
nise the emergence of modern classes in the island world” (1987, 11). In
seeking to excuse this reluctance, Antony Hooper proposed that “issues
of class and inequality” were absent because they had simply been “ex-
ported to New Zealand” (Hooper 1987, viii). This was a very curious
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argue that class ideologies, inequalities, and lifestyles were exported by
New Zealand to mirab states with return migration, remittances, and aid.
One of the few writers to have explicitly addressed the relative strengths
of elite and class analysis in the Pacific Islands is Vijay Naidu, who noted
that elite theories such as Hau‘ofa’s “disregard the fundamental impor-
tance of social classes, considering them as another social category on a
par with race, religion, regional and cultural groupings” (nd, 15). Naidu
proposed instead to distinguish between a metropolitan bourgeoisie, a
governing class, a supportive class, a working class, and a peasantry. One
of the advantages of this model is that it problematizes relations within
Hau‘ofa’s privileged strata (the metropolitan bourgeoisie, governing, and
supportive classes) and within the exploited poor (working class and
peasantry). Of particular significance for an understanding of changes in
Cook Islands society has been the expansion (and recent contraction) of
Naidu’s supporting class, that is, the largely tourism and aid-funded public
service.
Tourism-led economic expansion during the 1980s in the Cook Islands
saw the rapid growth of a white-collar salariat that, by 1990, constituted
25 percent of the workforce. Salaried workers earned, on average, more
than double the pay of the average wage earner (ciso 1989, 12). This
growth is reflected in tables 1 and 2, which give an indication of chang-
ing and current class composition. Table 1 shows that over the period
1981–1990 there was a 30 percent increase in the number of professional,
technical, managerial, and administrative workers (while the number of
clerical employees increased by 35 percent). Table 2 shows that in 1993,Table 1. Employment in Professional, Technical, Administrative and Managerial 
Occupations in Rarotonga
1971 1981 1990
Professional and technical 569.9 549.9 684.9
Administrative and managerial 172.9 145.9 219.9
Both categories as percentage of total workforce 116.9 119.9 125.5
Source: ciso 1971, 1981, 1990.
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Table 2. Average Weekly Earnings by Employment Sector
Number Percent
Average Weekly 
Earnings (nz$)
Legislators, senior officials, managers,
professionals
1,549 124.1 320
Technicians, associate professionals 1,614 129.6 259
Clerks 1,804 112.6 220
Others 3,439 153.7 169
Total 6,406 100.0
Source: ciso 1993.legislators, senior officials, managers, and professionals (24 percent of the
workforce) earned almost twice as much as “other” Cook Islanders (54
percent of the workforce).
Naidu’s supportive class in the Cook Islands constitutes about a quar-
ter of the Cook Islands workforce, and a significant number share the cul-
tural attributes that Hau‘ofa assigned to the Pacific Island elite stratum.
They speak English among themselves and to their children, were edu-
cated at New Zealand colleges and universities, the University of the
South Pacific, or the University of Hawai‘i, and they pursue relatively
affluent material lifestyles. Yet to describe their relationship to urban pro-
letarians and rural peasants as one of exploiter to exploited or dominat-
ing to dominated would be to misrepresent their position in Cook Islands
society. What is most interesting about the members of this group is not
the way they dominate or force traditions on the poor in order to main-
tain social stability—“that is to secure the privileges that they have
gained”—but the ways they express their class position in both the Cook
Islands and the region. Foremost among such expressions are nationalism
and cultural revival.
Traditionalization and Class Alienation
My argument, then, is very simple. The initially persuasive binary logic that
underpins Hau‘ofa’s 1980s Oceanic vision and 1990s revision—exploiting,
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and politically unhelpful in understanding the Cook Islands in that it mis-
represents the agency, cultured exclusivity, and class position of the major-
ity of those identified as belonging to the privileged stratum. The majority
of those whom Hau‘ofa would identify as belonging to a cultured elite
foisting tradition onto the poor are better described as belonging to a
growing middle class engaged in postcolonial nation-building. In direct-
ing their cultural and political agency toward nationalist ends, however
contradictory this activity may be in a globalizing economy, they have
been engaged in a form of ideological response to neocolonialism.
The same “mobile, internationalised middle class” that Hau‘ofa credited
with providing “intellectual and ideological leadership to social move-
ments,” such as the Pro-Democracy Movement in Tonga, is, in the Cook
Islands, engaged in traditionalization (Hau‘ofa 1994b, 425). While in
particular political contexts traditionalization can serve hegemonic ends
in Oceania (Lal 1992; Lawson 1996), it may also be deeply contradictory.
In the Cook Islands, as I have already noted, it arises out of the conver-
gence of state and business projects directed toward tourist development
and more popular projects directed toward greater local autonomy and
postcolonial identity. These latter projects have especially engaged the
passions of one fraction of Rarotonga’s middle class—Naidu’s supportive
class. A scan through my 1992 fieldnotes strongly suggests that “tradi-
tion” is now a middle-class identity project that is strongly embraced by
salaried public servants, teachers, and artists. Of those I personally knew
to be significantly engaged in the revival of language and tradition, six
were senior public servants, six were middle-ranking public servants, two
were tertiary educators, three were secondary teachers, two were artists,
two were working in the media, and one was a former space scientist
turned prime minister. Six of these also held traditional titles.
It is no coincidence that this middle class shares many of the character-
istics attributed to people at the forefront of new social movements else-
where. As Claus Offe noted, many of the active participants in women’s
movements, environmental movements, and peace movements are tertiary
educated and employed in community service professions (1985). Just as
it would be wrong to suggest that the actors in new social movements are,
in truth, seeking conservative ends, so it would be equally wrong to argue
that the Cook Islands middle class participates in cultural revival in order
to encourage social stability. Rather, my discussions with people engaged
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vations.
One artist had returned to the Cook Islands from New Zealand, where
he had been strongly influenced by the “Mâori renaissance” of the 1970s
and 1980s. Through his art and teaching he was especially concerned to
correct what he saw as a devaluation and misrepresentation of pre-Chris-
tian Cook Islands culture by church leaders. In this endeavor he was
quietly supported by other teachers and writers, although most were very
reluctant to openly challenge church orthodoxy. A senior public servant,
and holder of a mata‘iapo title, saw the 1992 Festival of Pacific Arts as an
opportunity to increase knowledge of and pride in the traditional history
of his ngâti (descent group), especially among its younger members. To
this end, he and other leaders of the ngâti organized the construction of a
marae and, with government assistance, an oceangoing vaka (canoe) that
would participate in the festival. Rituals associated with the marae and
vaka were consciously designed to enhance ngâti unity and were part of
ongoing efforts by traditional leaders to secure greater local autonomy
from the central government. A probation officer promoted and designed
armband tattoos, modeled loosely on those currently popular in Tahiti,
among young Cook Islanders. Strongly critical of a colonial cultural legacy
that can undermine the self-esteem of local youth, he was also active in
promoting the Cook Islands’ pre-Christian heritage through art and ocean-
voyaging projects.
These and other middle-class Cook Islanders engaged in revivals of tra-
dition, expressed a strong desire that they and their fellow citizens be
“proud to be Mâori.” In other words, the cultivation of a postcolonial
national identity that proclaimed independence from New Zealand was
actively and consciously pursued. Related to this was a strong desire to be
recognized as belonging to an independent Polynesian nation in a wider
Pacific and Polynesian community. Both desires were manifested in a high
level of participation in the hosting of the Festival of Pacific Arts in 1992.
Babadzan and others have been highly critical of the “fetishistic reifica-
tion” of culture that is effected and perpetuated through such festivals
because they “conceal the nation’s domination by and dependence on the
former colonial power, on international aid and on the world economy in
general” (Babadzan 1988, 223). But who is being deceived here? Certain-
ly not the middle-class participants from the Cook Islands, for whom par-
ticipation represented symbolic rejection of neocolonialism and depen-
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result of the festival, freed itself from aid dependency and the world econ-
omy. Quite the opposite. The festival heightened awareness of the coun-
try’s ongoing colonial links, in the context of which participation and
support for the festival was, for many, a conscious political act of (tempo-
rary) disengagement from them.
Neocolonial aid and tourist development have widened class divisions
in the Cook Islands. Higher levels of disposable income among members
of the middle class have encouraged less dependence on local kin and
community and greater personal autonomy. Combined with more affluent
lifestyles and greater access to global information flows, this increasing
autonomy has contributed to an increasing alienation of the middle class
from their local kin and community, sources of security and identity.
Return migrants have also experienced this sense of (class) alienation,
particularly those who are tertiary educated. One response to this class
alienation has been a conscious reidentification with kin and nation
through participation in projects of national identity and cultural revival.
While it may be tempting for some to view participation in such projects
as self-serving mystification—an attempt by members of the middle class
to ideologically erase class division and so preserve their privilege—this
would be to falsely impute a sociofunctional motive to the actors. Rather,
actors understand their own participation as a form of cultural resis-
tance, or at least cultural response, to colonialism and neocolonialism. In
identifying with kin and nation, albeit in a distinctly conscious way,
members of the middle class are both addressing their own class alien-
ation and reinforcing cultural differences between themselves and former
colonizers. Instead of gaining economic or full political autonomy, an
increasingly alienated Cook Islands middle class pursues greater cultural
autonomy.
Elsewhere in Oceania the pursuit of cultural autonomy takes on differ-
ent forms depending on levels of neocolonial dependence. In New Zea-
land, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Hawai‘i, where colonial rela-
tions remain most pervasive, close parallels with developments in the Cook
Islands are evident. These parallels are less obvious where nations have
achieved greater political independence. But wherever middle-class alien-
ation has developed in the context of neocolonial dependency, people have
turned to tradition as a source of common identity.
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eleventh Pacific History
Association Conference held at Hilo, Hawai‘i, 9–13 July 1996. I want to thank
the organizers of the conference for the opportunity to present and discuss my
ideas. I especially want to thank Wendy Pond for her detailed comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
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